The paper extends Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial contracting with information asymmetry ex post and endogenous "bankruptcy penalties" to allow for risk aversion of the borrower. The optimality of debt contracts, which Diamond obtained for the case of risk neutrality, is shown to be nonrobust to the introduction of risk aversion. This contrasts with the costly state verification literature, in which debt contracts are optimal for risk averse as well as risk neutral borrowers.
Introduction
Under a standard debt contract, a borrower's obligation to his financiers is independent of his actual returns or his ability to pay. If he cannot fulfil the obligation, he goes bankrupt, and the financiers may confiscate his remaining assets. The use of such contracts is commonly explained by differences in information of the borrower and his financiers about outcomes. If the borrower's obligation is independent of his own returns, it is easy for financiers to determine whether the obligation is being fulfilled or not. If the borrower's obligation depends on his returns, financiers have to ascertain what these returns actually are. This may be difficult or costly; the use of debt avoids this difficulty.
There are two distinct formalizations of this argument. The costly state verification approach of Townsend (1979) or Gale and Hellwig (1985) assumes that the information asymmetry can be lifted if resources are spent to provide the financier with information about the borrower's true ability to pay. If all participants are risk neutral, an optimal contract provides for such costly state verification if and only if the borrower cannot pay the prescribed amount; the borrower's remaining assets are then confiscated. This is interpreted as "bankruptcy".
In contrast, Diamond (1984) assumes that the information asymmetry cannot be lifted at all. It is however possible to use nonpecuniary "bankruptcy penalties" to discourage the borrower from claiming that he cannot repay the financiers. These penalties are chosen endogenously. Their magnitude is made to depend on the amount by which the borrower's payment falls short of his debt service obligation. If all participants are risk neutral, an optimal contract in this setting also takes the form of a standard debt contract.
The apparent similarity of the two approaches disappears if the assumption of risk neutrality is dropped. If the borrower is risk averse and only financiers risk neutral, the costly state verification approach still yields a modified version of a debt contract. In this modified version, the debtor has a state-independent debt service obligation, and state verification occurs if and only if he fails to fulfil this obligation. In the event of "bankruptcy", i.e., when state verification occurs, the borrower's assets are not entirely confiscated: He is left with a positive living allowance. This living allowance is the same in all "bankruptcy" states, providing an element of insurance against the borrower's return risk across bankruptcy states (Townsend (1979) , Gale and Hellwig (1985) ). Under the condition of Innes (1990) , that there must be no incentivefor the borrower to destroy returns before the financiers get to verify anything, the optimal level of this living allowance in the event of bankruptcy is actually equal to the lowest nonbankruptcy consumption of the borrower, i.e., the consumption he has if he can barely fulfil his debt service obligation.
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In contrast, the present paper shows that in Diamond's (1984) approach the optimality of debt contracts is not generally robust to the introduction of risk aversion. The underlying incentive considerations are significantly more complex, and an optimal incentive compatible contract should not be expected to have a simple mathematical form. The nonlinearity of the borrower's utility function implies that the nonpecuniary "bankruptcy penalty" that is required to discourage the borrower from underreporting his ability to pay will itself be given by a nonlinear function of the amount of underreporting. Moreover, an optimal contract will involve an element of risk sharing as well as finance. These two considerations interact in such a way that an optimal incentive-compatible contract will typically not take the form of a debt contract, even a debt contract with a positive living allowance.
The difference is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 . The heavy line in Figure 1 exhibits the relation between the return realization y of the borrower and his consumption c(y) under a standard debt contract, with c(y) = 0 for y below the repayment obligationŷ and c(y) = y −ŷ when y exceeds the repayment obligation. The dashed line in Figure 1 exhibits the same relation under a debt 1 As pointed out by Garino and Simmons (1998) , optimal contracting in the simple Townsend-Gale-Hellwig model with risk aversion requires that the bankruptcy living allowance have a marginal utility equal to the expected marginal utility of the borrower's consumption in nonbankruptcy states. This implies that the bankruptcy living allowance exceeds the lowest nonbankruptcy consumption level of the borrower. The Innes incentive condition eliminates this possibility, because in "bad nonbankruptcy states" the borrower must not want to destroy output in order to get into bankruptcy and avail himself of the bankruptcy living allowance.
contract with a living allowance ε > 0 in the event of "bankruptcy". In contrast, Figure 2 exhibits the relation between y and c(y) under an optimal contractà la Diamond (1984) when (i) financiers are risk neutral, (ii) the borrower exhibits constant relative risk aversion, and (iii) the ex ante distribution of returns is uniform over some interval [0, Y ]. For high values of y, the dependence of c(y) on y looks similar in all three cases, but for low values of y, contractingà la Diamond (1984) with risk aversion looks quite different from any form of debt. This suggests that Diamond's model of incentive contracting with endogenous "bankruptcy penalties" is rather less closely related to the costly state verification literature than the parallel results on the optimality of standard debt contracts under risk neutrality would seem to indicate.
I came across these findings when I wanted to extend Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial intermediation to allow for risk aversion of the potential financial intermediaries. Diamond (1984) had used his result on the optimality of debt contracts as an ingredient in the analysis of the conditions under which financial intermediation is efficient in the sense that the overall agency costs of intermediated finance are less than the agency costs of direct finance even though intermediation lengthens the chain of transactions. This analysis involves a diversification argument, which makes essential use of the assumption that intermediaries are risk neutral and raises the question of robustness to the introduction of risk aversion. On the way to answering this question, I found that risk aversion complicates not only the diversification argument for financial intermediation, but also the underlying model of incentive contracting. This latter complication is studied here; on the basis of this analysis, the viability of financial intermediation with risk aversion is studied in a companion paper (Hellwig (1998) ). That paper shows that the central results of Diamond (1984) on diversification across borrowers as a basis for intermediation are indeed robust to the introduction of risk aversion.
In the following, Section 2 develops the basic model of incentive contracting with ex post information asymmetry and endogenous bankruptcy penalties for a risk averse borrower. Section 3 discusses optimal contracts and explains the economics underlying the contract exhibited in Figure 2 . Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
Ex Post Information Asymmetry and Incentive Contracting with Nonlinear Utility
Like Diamond (1984) , I consider the financing of a venture that requires a fixed investment I > 0 and bears a random returnỹ. The random variableỹ has a probability distribution G with a density g, which is continuous and strictly positive on the interval [0, Y ]. The expected return of the venture is strictly greater than the cost I, i.e., 
The owner/manager of the venture, with own funds w ≥ 0, wants to raise external finance, either because his funds are less than the investment outlay, or because he wants to share the risk of his venture with others. Outside financiers know the return distribution G, but -in contrast to the entrepreneur -they are unable to observe the realizations of the return random variableỹ. The agency problems caused by this information asymmetry can be reduced through the use of nonpecuniary penalties as a device to discourage misreporting of return realizations. These penalties are determined endogenously as part of the finance contract and moreover they can be made to depend on the entrepreneur's report about his return realization and his actual payment to his financiers.
A finance contract is represented by a number L indicating the funds provided by outside financiers and by two functions r(.) and p(.) such that for any z ∈ [0, Y ], r(z) is the payment to financiers and p(z) ≥ 0 is the nonpecuniary penalty the entrepreneur suffers when he reports that his return realization is equal to z. With outside funds L, his own financial contribution to his project is E = I − L ≤ w. Any excess of w over E is invested in an alternative asset, which is safe and has a gross rate of return equal to one.
Given a finance contract (L, r(.), p(.)), the entrepreneur's consumption is w + L − I + y − r(z) if the true return realization is y and the reported return realization is z; the corresponding payoff realization is u(
for all y ∈ [0, Y ], so the entrepreneur's consumption is never negative. A contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is said to be incentive compatible if it is feasible and moreover
for all y ∈ [0, Y ] and all z ∈ [0, Y ] such that w + L − I + y ≥ r(z), so he has no incentive to misreport his return realization. The utility function u(.) is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave as well as twice continuously differentiable on ++ ; moreover, u(0) = lim c→0 u(c), with the usual conventions when lim c→0 u(c) = −∞, e.g., when u(.) = ln(.). Given these assumptions, standard arguments from incentive theory yield: 
Condition (4) shows that for a given loan size L and repayment function r(.), incentive compatibility determines the penalty function p(.) up to a constant of integration, p(Y ). If r(.) is differentiable, this condition is actually equivalent to the differential equation dp dy
showing that as the return realization y goes down, the penalty p(y) goes up at a rate which depends on the rate dr dy at which the payment r(y) goes down as y goes down.
As an illustration, consider the class of finance contracts (L, r(.), p(.)) such that
for some fixed ε ≥ 0 ,ŷ ∈ (0, Y ), and all y ∈ [0, Y ]. Such contracts can be interpreted as debt contracts with a minimum living allowance ε. The amount w + L − I +ŷ − ε represents a return-independent debt service obligation. If the entrepreneur can meet this obligation he does so and retains the excess of his actual return y overŷ as well as ε. If he cannot meet the obligation w + L − I +ŷ − ε, he defaults and retains just the minimum living allowance ε. If the minimum living allowance is zero, (6) is the repayment function for a standard debt contract as studied by Diamond (1984) or Gale and Hellwig (1985) . By (6), a debt contract has dr dy = 0 if y >ŷ and the obligation w+L−I +ŷ−ε is met, but dr dy = 1 if y <ŷ and the entrepreneur defaults on his obligation. Thus condition (5) entails dp dy = 0 if y >ŷ, and dp dy = −u (ε) if y <ŷ; condition (4) reduces to:
If ε = 0 and u (0) = 1, (7) is exactly the condition that Diamond (1984) gives for the incentive compatibility of a standard debt contract for the case of risk neutrality 2 , requiring that the difference p(y) − p(Y ) be just equal to the amount of money that the entrepreneur saves by paying r(y) rather than r(Y ). For y ∈ [ŷ, Y ] of course, (6) implies r(y) = r(Y ) and hence p(y) = p(Y ). If u (ε) = 1, the money gain r(ŷ) − r(y) =ŷ − y from reporting y <ŷ rather thanŷ under the repayment function (6) has to be weighted by u (ε) so as to as to make the penalty p(y) commensurate with the utility gain from reporting y rather thanŷ and paying r(y) rather than r(ŷ). (If u (0) is very large, this militates against the use of a standard debt contract as opposed to one with a minimum living allowance ε > 0.)
Turning to the choice between contracts, I note that the entrepreneur's expected payoff from an incentive-compatible contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is equal to:
Upon using (4) to substitute for p(y) and integrating the resulting double integral by parts, one finds that this is equal to
As for the financiers, I assume that there are enough of them dividing the uncertain return r(ỹ) among each other so that they assess the contract (L, r(.), p(.)) as if they were risk neutral. They are only concerned as to whether the expected gross return 
Condition (1) ensures that the set of acceptable contracts is nonempty. An acceptable incentive-compatible finance contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is called optimal if it maximizes the entrepreneur's expected payoff (8) , respectively (9), over the set of all acceptable incentive-compatible contracts.
In the remainder of the paper, I study the properties of optimal incentivecompatible contracts. I begin with the observation that, as shown in (9), the entrepreneur wants p(Y ), the penalty he suffers when he reports the maximum possible return, to be as small as possible. As for the financiers, (10) shows that their payoff is independent of p(Y ); moreover (4) shows that incentive compatibility hinges on the difference p(y) − p(Y ) rather than the level of p(Y ). Trivially then one obtains:
Remark 2 Any optimal incentive-compatible contract satisfies p(Y ) = 0.
Optimal Incentive-Compatible Contracts
In view of Proposition 1, the problem of finding an optimal incentive-compatible contract is equivalent to the problem of finding a loan size L ≥ I − w and a nondecreasing repayment function r(.) so as to maximize (9), with p/Y ) = 0, subject to the feasibility constraint (2) and the acceptability condition (10). It is convenient to rewrite this problem in terms of the entrepreneur's consumption pattern c(.), where for any
Since (11) implies dr(y) = dy − dc(y), the objective function (9) with p(Y ) = 0 can be rewritten as
Upon combining the first and the third term and integrating, one can further rewrite this as
The financiers' participation constraint (10) is similarly rewritten as:
Finally, with (4) subsumed in (9), respectively (13), feasibility and incentive compatibility reduce to the requirements that
and that r(.) be nondecreasing or, equivalently, that An optimal contract always exhibits the feature of a debt contract whereby for high realizations of the borrower's return a further increase in his return leaves his payment to the financiers unaffected, i.e., all of this increase serves to raise his consumption. This reflects the prominence of u(c(Y )) in (13): For return levels close to Y , it is important to have c(y) increase as much as possible with y so as to make c(Y ) and hence u(c(Y )) large. Accordingly the consumption patterns in Figures 1 and 2 all have a slope dc dy equal to one when the return level y is close to the upper bound Y .
In contrast, for low realizations of the borrower's return, an optimal contract in the presence of risk aversion does not always exhibit the feature of a debt contract that lenders confiscate everything "in the event of bankruptcy". Indeed Propositions 6 -8 below show that for many specifications of the borrower's utility function the repayment owed to lenders is insensitive to the borrower's return realization when the latter is low as well as when it is high, and the borrower's consumption c(y) is bounded away from zero.
The analysis uses control-theoretic methods. If c(.) was known to be absolutely continuous, the problem of maximizing (13) under the constraints (14) -(16) could be formulated as a standard optimum-control problem with control v(y) := dc dy (y) and (16) equivalent to the requirement that v(y) ≤ 1 for all y. The assumptions here do not actually guarantee this. Even so, the consumption pattern induced by an optimal contract must satisfy a suitable analogue of Pontryagin's conditions. This is the point of:
Proposition 5 Let c(.) correspond to an optimal incentive-compatible contract. Then there exist a scalar µ > 0 and a continuously differentiable real-valued
ψ(y) ≥ 0, with equality unless in a neighbourhood of y (18) c(.) is continuously differentiable with dc dy = 1,
If u (.) is a strictly increasing function, these conditions are sufficient as well as necessary for c(.) to maximize (13) under the constraints (14)- (16); in this case, the optimal contract is unique in the sense that consumption patterns corresponding to different optimal contracts all coincide on (0, Y ].
It is instructive to consider the case of constant absolute risk aversion. In this case, as in the more general case of nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, u (.) is automatically a strictly increasing function, so the maximand (13) is strictly concave in c(.), and the last part of Proposition 5 applies, i.e., the consumption pattern corresponding to an optimal contract is completely characterized by the Pontryagin conditions (17)-(20). This yields:
Proposition 6 Assume that u(.) exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, i.e., that u(c) ≡ −e −δc for some δ > 0. Assume further that the distribution G(.) is uniform, i.e., that g(y) ≡ 1/Y , and let c(., δ) be the consumption pattern corresponding to an optimal incentive-compatible contract.
(a) If δ is sufficiently close to zero, then c(., δ) has the form shown in Figure  1 , i..e.,
whereŷ ∈ [0, Y ) is chosen so that (14) holds with equality.
(b) If δ is sufficiently large, then c(., δ) has the form shown in Figure 2 , i.e., c(0, δ) > 0, and there exist y 1 (δ),
and
Moreover as δ goes out of bounds, y 1 (δ) converges to zero, y 2 (δ) converges to Y , and c(., δ) converges to the constant function with value w − I + y dG(y),
With constant absolute risk aversion, a standard debt contract is optimal if risk aversion is close to zero, but not if risk aversion is large. To understand the economics behind this result, go back to the borrower's objective function as specified in (12) and rewrite this in the form
where, for any y, v(y) := dc dy . (In the constellation of Proposition 6 this is actually legitimate.) In the case of risk neutrality, with u(c) ≡ c and u (c) ≡ 1, (24) simplifies to
An optimal contract must obviously satisfy (14) The appearance of the weights G(y) in the expressions for expected nonpecuniary penalties in (25) reflects the fact that the incentive compatibility condition (4) relates changes in p(.) to changes in r(.) , y] , the increase in penalties as one goes from y to y − ∆ affects the level of penalties not just at y − ∆, but at all return levels y < y (to discourage the entrepreneur from misreporting y instead of y − ∆). This explains why the "increase" dr = (1 − v(y)) dy enters (25) with the weight G(y) of the set of all return levels less than y. Given this appearance of the weights G(y) in (25), under risk neutrality it is desirable to concentrate the deviations of v(y) from one at low levels of y.
A simple comparison of (24) and (25) shows that this argument for the optimality of debt contracts is heavily dependent on the assumption of risk neutrality. If the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(.) is strictly concave, two additional considerations must be taken into account: First, when the borrower is risk averse, the first term in (24) depends on the riskiness as well as the mean of the random variable c(ỹ) = w + L − I +ỹ − r(ỹ). If u (c) is large when c is close to zero, this militates against c(ỹ) being zero with positive probability. Secondly, the weight with which "the increase" dr enters the expected value of the nonpecuniary penalties in the last term in (24) depends on u (c(y)) as well as G(y), the point being that the nonpecuniary penalties have to compensate for utility gains from false reporting, not just the money gains. If marginal utility is large, a given money gain from false reporting may translate into a large utility gain, requiring a large penalty to keep the borrower honest. Whereas under risk neutrality, expected nonpecuniary penalties are minimized by concentrating the increases of r(.) at those return levels where G(y) is small, with risk aversion, they are minimized by concentrating them at those return levels where u (c(y))G(y) is small. This need not be where y is small.
The consumption pattern in Figure 2 reflects these considerations. In Figure  2 , in contrast to Figure 1 , the slope v(y) = dc dy is equal to one for very low as well as very high values of y; this reflects the possibility that the weight u (c(y))G(y) of the term (1−v(y)) in (24) may be large if c(y) is small and u (c(y)) is large. In an intermediate range in Figure 2 , v(y) = dc dy lies strictly between zero and one, reflecting a tradeoff at the margin between considerations of risk sharing (calling for a low value of v(y)), the need to repay the financiers (again calling for a low value of v(y)) and the desire to keep nonpecuniary penalties low (calling for a high value of v(y)).
The important point is that in the presence of risk aversion the finance contract provides for risk sharing as well as finance. Even if w ≥ I, i.e., if the entrepreneur is able to finance his project on his own, he may still want to bring in an external investor as this enables him to maintain his consumption when project returns are low. He has to pay for this insurance in terms of nonpecuniary penalties, but depending on his risk preferences and on the distribution of returns, he may well find this worthwhile. This is, e.g., always the case in the constellation of Proposition 6 when δ is large; in this case, regardless of the relation of w and I, an optimal incentive-compatible contract will provide the entrepreneur with a consumption pattern close to the nonrandom constant w − I + ydG(y).
More 
For other specifications of utility and distribution functions, yet more complicated finance contracts may be optimal. To see this, note that if v(y) = 
Using (29), one easily verifies that if u (.) is strictly increasing and g(.)/G(.) is nondecreasing, then the consumption pattern c(.) that corresponds to an optimal incentive-compatible contract is nondecreasing. Otherwise, e.g., if u (.) is increasing and the hazard rate function g(.)/G(.) is not everywhere nondecreasing, c(.) may be decreasing somewhere. Moreover, depending on the slope of the function u −1 (−µg(.)/G(.)), the number of switches back and forth between intervals where dc dy takes an interior value and intervals where dc dy = 1 may be arbitrarily large. Optimal incentive-compatible contracts are thus very sensitive to the specification of the functions u (.) and g(.)/G(.).
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Suppose first that a finance contract satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of the proposition. If z < y, concavity of u(.) implies u (w+L−I+x−r(x)) ≥ u (w+L−I+y−r(x)) for all x ∈ [z, y]. By the monotonicity of r(.), one then has:
u (w + L − I + y − r) dr which means that (A.1) implies (3). Alternatively, if z > y, concavity of u(.) implies u (w + L − I + x − r(x)) ≤ u (w + L − I + y − r(x)) for all x ∈ [y, z]. By the monotonicity of r(.), one then has:
u (w + L − I + y − r) dr and again (A.1) implies (3). This shows that any finance contract which satisfies assertions (i) and (ii) in the proposition is incentive-compatible.
Conversely, suppose that a contract (L, r(.), p(.)) is incentive-compatible. Let 0 ≤ y 1 < y 2 ≤ Y . Apply the incentive compatibility condition (1) once with y = y 2 and z = y 1 , and, assuming that r(y 2 ) ≤ w + L − I + y 1 , 4 once with y = y 1 and z = y 2 , and add the resulting inequalities.
This yields
or, after a rearrangement of terms,
Given that u(.) is strictly concave, this inequality implies r(y 2 ) ≥ r(y 1 ), proving that r(.) is nondecreasing on [0, Y ].
To prove that the contract also satisfies (4), note that for any y ∈ [0, Y ] and x < y , (3) implies
For any y * ∈ [0, Y ] and any sequence {y i } n i=1 with y 1 = y * < y 2 < ... < y n = Y , a repeated application of (A.2) with y = y i , x = y i−1 , i = 2, ..., n, yields
Further, a precisely parallel argument, based on incentive compatibility relative to upward deviations in reports, yields
Given that the right-hand sides of (A.3) and (A.4) are just the approximating sums for the Stieltjes integral in (4), the validity of (4) where the supremum is taken over all sequences {y in } in {y i } that converge to y. Given that the functions c k (.), k = 1, 2, ..., all satisfy (15) and (16), one easily verifies that the function c(.) also satisfies (15) and (16), and that c(y)=lim k c k (y) for any continuity point y of c(.). By construction, c(.) is upper semi-continuous. In view of (16) this implies that c(.) is left-continuous and that any discontinuity point y of c(.) satisfies c(y) > lim y y c(y ). This in turn implies that c(.) has at most countably many discontinuity points, so the set of continuity points of c(.) and hence the set of points on which {c k (y)} converges to c(y) and {u (c k (y))} converges to u (c(y)) has full measure. By Fatou's Lemma, it follows that the validity of (14) for c k (.), k = 1, 2, ..., entails the validity of (14) for c(.) and moreover that
By the definition of u * , it follows that u(c(Y )) − u (c(y)) G(y) dy = u * so that the supremum of (13) on the set of functions satisfying (14)- (16) is actually attained at c(.), and hence is a maximum. (c(y ) ). But then a small reduction in c(y ) for y belonging to a small interval to the left of y, combined with a suitably chosen small increase in c(y ) for y belonging to a small interval to the right of y, will raise the value of (13) without affecting the validity of (14) -(16). The assumption that c(.) is not continuous on (0, Y ] thus leads to a contradiction and must be false.
To prove that c(Y ) > 0, I note that, by standard arguments, there exists a Lagrange multiplier µ such that if c(.) maximizes (13) under the constraints (14)-(16), then c(.) also maximizes
under the constraints (15) and (16); the constant K in (A.7) is again given by (A.6). Since both u(.) and −u (.) are strictly increasing functions, µ must be strictly positive. For any ε > 0, consider the consumption patternĉ ε (.) such
Clearly,ĉ ε (.) satisfies (15) and (16), and so doesĉ λ ε (.) = (1 − λ)c(.) + λĉ ε (.) for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that for any ε > 0 the derivative
must be nonpositive at λ = 0, and one must have
Since u (c(y)) < 0 for all y and, by (16), Now let µ > 0 again be the Lagrange multiplier in (A.7) and consider the control problem max 
i.e.ĉ F (.) also satisfies (16). Given that c(.) maximizes (A.7) under the constraints (15)-(16), it follows that To complete the proof of Proposition 5, assume that u (.) is a strictly increasing function. Then −u (.) is a strictly concave function, and (13) defines a strictly concave functional on the set of consumption plans c(.). Since the set of plans satisfying (14)- (16) is convex, the optimal c(.) is unique up to a set of measure zero; given the continuity property established in Proposition 4, the optimal c(.) in fact is unique up to the possible discontinuity at y = 0. Sufficiency of Pontryagin's conditions for characterizing this optimal c(.) follows as in Theorem 1, p. 141, of Mangasarian (1966) . 
if δ is sufficiently small so that δ 2ŷ ≤μ(δ). For y >ŷ, (A.24) implies
In either case, (17) (b) To prove part (b), I begin by specifying the critical values y 1 (δ), y 2 (δ) for the kinks in the consumption pattern c(., δ). By standard calculus arguments, there exists a unique z 1 > 1 such that
For any X ≥ 3, there exists z 2 (X) ∈ (1, X) such that
ranges between +∞ and 3 − e −2 as z 3 ranges from 1 to 2, so put
From (A.27), one has lim δ→∞ y 1 (δ) = 0. From (A.26) and the fact that z 2 (X) > 1 for X ≥ 3, one also has lim X→∞ (X − z 2 (X)) = 1, so (A.28) implies lim δ→∞ δ(Y − y 2 (δ)) = 1, hence lim δ→∞ y 2 (δ) = Y. In particular, one has 0 < y 1 (δ) < y 2 (δ) < Y if δ is sufficiently large. Let δ be such that 0 < y 1 (δ) < y 2 (δ) < Y, and, for any parametrically given µ > 0, consider the consumption patternĉ(., δ, µ) such that
Given the monotonicity ofĉ(., δ, µ) in µ, there exists a unique µ(δ) such that
where K > 0 is again given by (A.6). I claim that for any sufficiently large δ the consumption pattern c(., δ) :=ĉ(., δ, µ(δ)) corresponds to an optimal incentivecompatible contract.
To establish this claim, I first show that if δ is sufficiently large, then c(., δ) satisfies the constraints (14)-(16). (14) holds trivially, by the definition of µ(δ). As for (15), I note that (A.27)-(A.31) imply
for all y and δ, hence To show that c(., δ) :=ĉ(., δ, µ(δ)) is actually optimal, I specify the costate variable ψ(.) =ψ(., δ) wherê
Given the conditions (A.25)-(A.28) for y 1 (δ) and y 2 (δ), it is straightforward to check that the consumption pattern c(., δ), the Lagrange multiplier µ(δ), and the costate variable ψ(.) =ψ(., δ) defined by (A.33)-(A.35) satisfy conditions (17)-(20). As in part (a) of the proposition, the optimality of the consumption pattern c(., δ) for any sufficiently high δ now follows from the last part of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let lim c→0 u (c) = ∞. If c(y) = 0 for a nonnull set of return levels y ∈ [0, Y ], then the integral in (13) is undefined and one cannot be at a maximum of (13) under the constraints (14)-(16). Therefore one must have c(y) > 0 for all but a null set of return levels y ∈ [0, Y ]. Suppose that, contrary to the first statement of the proposition, c(y ) = 0 for some y > 0. Then there exists a sequence {y k } converging to y from below such that the associated sequence {c(y k )} converges to c(y ) = 0 monotonically from above and moreover v(y k ) < 1 for all k. By (18), it follows that ψ(y k ) = 0 for all k dψ dy (y ) = 0, which is incompatible with (17). This proves the first statement of the proposition.
Next impose the stronger assumption that lim c→∞ u (c)c = −∞. To prove the second statement of the proposition, I first show that this assumption implies ψ(y) > 0 and hence, by (18), dc dy = 1 for any y that is sufficiently close to zero. For suppose that this claim is false. Then there exists a sequence {y k } converging to zero such that ψ(y k ) = 0 for all k. Then (18) implies that for each k, ψ(.) has a local minimum at y k , i.e., one must have and using l'Hospital's rule, one also finds that lim k→∞ u (c(y k ))c(y k ) = −∞ implies lim k→∞ (y k /c(y k )) = 0 and hence that y k < c(y k ) for any sufficiently large k. The assumption that there exists a sequence {y k } converging to zero such that ψ(y k ) = 0 for all k has thus led to a contradiction and must be false. This proves that ψ(y) > 0 and 
